He who pays the piper calls the tune!

Reduced to listeners and implementers, the South and its beneficiaries is now getting a comeback with ‘partnerships’ attempting to introduce some equity in development decision-making. Okech-Owiti, Lawyer and Joint Co-ordinator of CLEAN, takes a consensus-building look at the interests in play in development assistance.

Development assistance presupposes some form of shortfall or inadequacy in the capacity of a ‘community’ in specific elements of development. Such shortfall could be at a variety of levels, including: determination of a development ideology or crafting of development policies, strategies and plans, and related legislative frameworks; project development; machines, machine tools and related technology; organisational, managerial, technological and technical skills, and finance for investment in production as well as social services.

It is this shortfall in capacity, which the ‘assisting party’ is supposed to cover by providing the ‘missing’ input.

But who should be setting the criteria for development assistance to African countries in general and Kenya in particular? Who should be deciding whether or not development assistance is necessary, and for what purpose, in what form and under what conditions it should be provided?

Traditionally, it has been generally a case of ‘He (sic!) who pays the piper calls the tune!’ Decisions on these matters have generally been made at two levels: that of the countries or institutions providing the assistance, and that of government bureaucrats. The eventual ‘beneficiaries’ - the citizens for whom development assistance is ultimately meant – have played a very peripheral role in decision-making. In the classical situation, citizens have found themselves involved in projects, which have been decided on by their governments and institutions providing the assistance without their meaningful participation.

Ordinarily, it has been the ‘assisting’ countries’ that decide; where (that is, which sector of the economy) they would put their assistance; the form in which it is given (whether in cash, personnel or through finished products), and the conditions under which it is given.

This has been true of both bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. The classic case is, of course, the so-called conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the IMF under the Structural Adjustment Programmes. They include

• liberalisation of investment, foreign exchange, financial markets and trade;
• deregulation, divestment by the state and privatisation and implementation of ‘free-market’ policies;
• reform of fiscal policies;
• decentralisation of services and civil service restructuring;
• public accountability, and, almost as an after-thought,
• democratisation and good governance.

Some of these conditionalities are positive and for the good of the citizens meant to benefit from the assistance, like fighting against corruption, reducing bureaucracy and increasing efficiency, and democracy and good governance. However, the issue here is that it is not the citizens who decide which conditionalities are appropriate in their case.

There is also always a claim by both bilateral and multilateral donors that these conditionalities are ‘negotiated’ with and ‘accepted’ by the recipient countries. But there are three problems here. One, many of the negotiators on the part of the recipient countries are often not knowledgeable enough to be able to counter the demands of the donors. Two, some of the negotiators have interests other than those of their citizens and are often guided by these interests rather than the needs of their citizens. Three, the balance of power is generally tilted in favour of the assisting states or institutions, often leaving the recipient countries too weak to resist. And just as important, citizens of these countries do not take part and are not even consulted over the ‘negotiation’ or ‘acceptance’ of these conditionalities.

In respect of assistance given through civil society organisations (CSOs), there is usually an assumption that it is based on ‘proposals’ determined by the CSOs. However, at the end of it assisting agencies decide which proposals will be funded. Moreover, the CSOs – except, perhaps, community-based organisations (CBOs) - do not always consult with their constituents before they propose a particular project, except in cases where baseline surveys and need assessments are conducted prior to the proposal.

Both at the international and national levels, there are efforts to get the voices of ‘the voiceless’ heard. At the international level, there have been protests at World Trade Organisation (WTO) and ‘G7’ meetings and criticisms at conferences and summits on the environment and social aspects of development. At the national levels, civil society groups have increasingly questioned conditionalities and the manner in which their governments accept and use assistance. There has even been a push to have civil society involved in negotiations and decisions relating to assistance.

There are two main trends in respect to assistance. Firstly, there are efforts to change the nature of relationships from that of a donor-recipient one to one based on the concept of ‘partnership’. Of course, the meaning attached to this term and the manner in which it is practised on the ground differ from one assisting agency to another. Secondly, CSOs are being progressively forced to engage their constituents in decision-making, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development activities. There are even demands for accountability not just to the assisting agencies (that is ‘upwards’), but to the constituents (‘downwards’) as well. Both of these trends have arisen from the idea that development must, by definition, include ‘participation’ of those whose lives are or are likely to be affected.

Does all this mean that assisting states or institutions should not pursue their own interests through the assistance? Far from it! We consider that there are, at least, four stakeholders in issues of development assistance whose interests are equally important. These are the assisting state or institution, the citizens of the assisting state, the recipient state or institution and the citizens of the recipient state or the constituents of the recipient institution. Each of them has legitimate concerns, which should be taken into account. The assisting state or institution has a right to decide whether it wants to assist or not, the nature and form of that assistance, the sectors to be assisted and the conditions under which the assistance will be granted. The citizens of the assisting country have a right to demand that their government efficiently uses resources for positive development activities and accounts for the use. But just as important, the recipient states, institutions and peoples also have a right to decide whether or not they need assistance, for what sectors, in what form and under what conditions.

This is obviously a recipe for conflict where the legitimate interests of the stakeholders diverge. This, however, is where informed and effective participation and negotiation comes in. Where each stakeholder has an equal opportunity to advance its interests as well as to listen to and consider the other stakeholders’, decision-making is more likely to settle at the ‘objectively’ legitimate interests and needs of each stakeholder. Such a decision is more likely to be equitable. This is an ideal that can only be achieved where the relationship is based on the concept of ‘partnership’.

A most difficult issue to deal with is the practice of attaching personnel and other resources from the assisting state or institution to the assistance. Some assisting states or institutions insist on providing personnel, whether in the form of consultants, expatriates, ‘development workers’, volunteers or others. Some require the recipient state or institution to source such things as machinery, machine tools, electronic hardware and software or raw materials and other project inputs from them or from sources identified or authorised by them.

On the face of it, it is arguable that this is a legitimate interest of the assisting state or institution. The deciding factors however ought to be three: whether the recipient state, institution or citizens actually need these resources specifically, whether the specific resources are appropriate for their use and whether the assisting state or institution is the most appropriate source. For example, personnel may have specific knowledge or skills, which are required by the recipients but are not locally available or are not available elsewhere under better conditions. The same can be said of the other resources.

There are, however, situations where the attachment of personnel serves another development policy or purpose, apart from ‘merely’ providing knowledge and skills. An example is found in exchange programmes as part of development assistance. In such cases, provision of knowledge or skills is just one part of the objectives. The other is to exchange ideas and experiences and learn from each other, in terms of both intellectual and technical knowledge, and cultural beliefs and practices. Depending on the significance of this objective, it may be a justification for personnel assistance. Intrinsic in this, however, is a two-way traffic. It presupposes that personnel, however defined, will move from/to both sides of the stakeholder divide.